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chapter 10
When International Dialogue about Military Ethics 
Confronts Diverse Cultural and Political Practices: 
‘Guilt and Confession’ as a Case in Point
George R. Wilkes
 Perspectives on Dialogue about a Common Professional  
Military Ethics
The present essay compares two approaches to the fact of cultural diversity 
in the understanding and practice of professional military ethics. A first ap-
proach focuses on the shared features visible in ethics teaching in militaries 
across the world: common points whose broad acceptance gives added power 
to the sense that there are norms which should govern military behaviour and 
which cross all cultures. Frequently, this first approach starts either with a list 
of common virtues, or with a set of moral, legal, organisational or psychological 
reasons which make sense of the commitment to international law. In the face 
of pressure to abandon ethical conduct, these tools are expected to strengthen 
the ethical capacity of a combatant by focusing on a framework in which their 
motivation and intention are of critical importance.
A second approach instead focuses on questions about an individual’s prep-
aration for ethical decision-making, questions that are easily seen as matters of 
cultural diversity, political context or private conscience. These questions may 
relate to intention and motivation. They may also focus on practices or social 
structures deemed to support the ethical life that is not dependent primarily 
on expectations of right intention or correct judgement. In this second view, 
these social dimensions are the realities in which ethics are made sense of – 
they are the environmental factors shaping motivations and driving ethical 
conduct. In this perspective, it would be missing a crucial part in the process 
of creating ethical cultures to focus narrowly on a ‘lowest common denomina-
tor’ across all cultures, or to adopt a simplistic declarative approach to making 
norms effective in real social contexts.
While the pragmatically-inclined reader might be tempted to say both ap-
proaches must be kept in mind, the two ways of interpreting the process of 
making ethics effective do clash: they do not suggest the same understanding 
of what constitutes a functional approach to ethics. For pragmatic reasons we 
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may wish to brush this off, although it may well be that an eclectic, pragmatic 
mix of the two approaches – some universalist assumptions about right inten-
tion nuanced by a nod to some examples of practical difficulties presented by 
cultural diversity – is a weak basis for the process of developing a coherent and 
functioning practical ethics.
 The Need for an Interpretive Framework That Embraces the 
Divergent Perspectives
The comparison between these two approaches is explored in this essay in re-
lation to guilt and its consequences. Should a combatant who shoots a non- 
combatant confess? If so, to whom should they confess, and what do they 
confess? Are these questions matters of professional military ethics? Does pro-
fessional military ethics education have a place in preparing a virtuous mili-
tary leader to respond to ethical failings once they have occurred? Or is this a 
matter only for conscience, for the chaplain, or for military legal experts?
Very different views responding to this question are held, very strongly, by 
proponents of one or the other of the two approaches to normative behaviour 
and to cultural diversity in military life that we are exploring here. Because 
there are such very different answers to this question, the project of defining 
military ethics through a general consensus about military virtues or about the 
centrality of international law cannot be taken for granted. One of the princi-
pal objectives of the present essay is to show how much there is to gain from 
an international dialogue which embraces the complexity of factors and re-
sponses involved, giving professional military ethics the fullest practical trac-
tion in each situation in which they are applied. Neither of the two approaches 
described above is taken for granted, and neither is dismissed – instead, we will 
see that the appropriate relationship between the two approaches will differ 
according to context and to the task at stake. If the essay were to focus on a dif-
ferent set of ethical interests rather than on guilt and confession, the response 
of the reader might be quite different, and we will return to this in the penulti-
mate and concluding sections of the essay.
How we describe the difference between discourses about military ethics 
which exclude or which embrace cultural diversity matters very much, the 
more so if we distinguish one or other approach as more ethical or more legiti-
mate. A spectrum of responses seen in the literature could be described as run-
ning from the most restrictive to the most expansive position. Whereas many 
introductory accounts define professional military ethics through reference to 
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a common set of military virtues of values,1 it is also commonly acknowledged 
that military educators from different countries use very different philosophi-
cal tools in their teaching,2 and a small number of more sociological studies 
also reflect upon the extent to which the effective uptake of ethics education is 
influenced by complicated social realities, and in particular by cultural diver-
sity, a point developed at length in research being developed in the Canadian 
military, for instance.3
A further dimension to the diversity of lenses through which this argument 
over the nature of military ethics is seen is the reliability of our knowledge 
about what makes ethics effective. These are not simply poles in an argument 
over core truths or good norms. Both perspectives also involve judgements 
about philosophical and practical factors, such as the utility of insisting on 
moral or philosophical coherence and, in contrast with this, the practical con-
sequences of embracing diversity in inculcating norm-respecting behaviour 
in a range of military contexts. Add to this the fact that in many institutional 
contexts, a preference for one or other approach may be fixed, or embedded in 
institutional culture and not freely chosen, and it is more clear that the spec-
trum of positions between restrictive and expansive are not a simple reflection 
of a straight choice: to value universality against a choice to value diversity, 
or to credit or to wholly discredit the independent force of an ethical educa-
tion focused on intention and motivation. This essay therefore frames choices 
about when and whether to exclude or embrace culturally diverse ethical re-
sponses in terms of the strengths and also the risks or the costs of each alterna-
tive response.
We may, then, acknowledge the force of different answers in different con-
texts. The spectrum we are examining is different from a straightforward battle 
between universalism and cultural relativism – it envisages a wider range of 
factors creating the reality in which ethical decisions are made and are effec-
tive. The question posed is not a purely normative question, such as: is it right 
to take account of divergent cultural norms? It also involves addressing the 
ways in which ethical discourse is in fact applied: Are professional military 
ethics seen as distinct from the realm of private or culturally specific  morality 
1 Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee, and Don Carrick (ed.), Ethics Education in the Military (Ashgate 
2008) 1–7.
2 Ibid.
3 E.g., Deanna Messervey and Jennifer M. Peach, ‘Battlefield Ethics: What Influences Ethical 
Behaviour in Operations?’ in Gary Ivey et al. (eds), The Human Dimensions of Operations: 
A Personnel Research Perspective (Canadian Defence Academy Press 2014) 83–101.
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and guilt, and distinct from assessments of behaviour which is shameful? Do 
professional military ethics provide responses to moral questions on which 
universal agreement is hard to envisage? Who are the legitimate judges of 
a military professional’s moral guilt? Who should we trust with judgements 
about the responses that are appropriate once that guilt is ascertained? Are we 
to limit the sense of ‘guilt’ in ethics classes to legal contexts, or should teach-
ing take account of the political nature of judicial procedures, or with popular 
sensibilities about the morally outrageous, though these may vary greatly? The 
different approaches to defining international military norms each have real 
strengths as well as shortcomings. While some will see this lack of clarity as 
a reason for the framers of professional military ethics education to fix on a 
lowest common denominator and to ignore points where responses suggest 
uncertainty, complexity or subjectivity, others will argue that diversity char-
acterises the reality within which military values are formed, and this should 
not be sidelined. The objective of the present contribution is to articulate ways 
in which dialogue between different perspectives on these problems can be 
productive in advancing international understanding about the nature and ap-
plication of professional military ethics.
 Guilt and Confession: Cultures and Other Diversities
How does guilt come up in teaching and academic writing about military eth-
ics? What kind of expectations are there for a military professional to confess if 
they believe themselves to be guilty? Guilt is not normally treated with system-
atic attention in military ethics courses, for many reasons; confession even less 
so. Of course, we will easily see that guilt plays a part in the framing of ethics 
education, without being the subject of attention in its own right.
One reason for this is the uneasy relationship between legal and social forms 
of guilt. We have expectations that military professionals will seek to avoid ac-
tions that bring guilt, at least in a legal sense. Without defining guilt in the 
classroom, we may have expectations that students will understand guilt in a 
certain way, and we may take for granted a set of appropriate practical respons-
es to guilt, instead of seeing how they raise practical problems – pedagogical, 
social or political problems – that need to be understood in the ethics class.
Illegal actions bring a legal form of war guilt; and this is how we meet guilt4 
in the seminal book Just and Unjust Wars by Michael Walzer, a book  occasioned 
4 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (1st edn, 
Basic Books 1977) 297–298.
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by the Vietnam War. It is sometimes argued that the development of military 
ethics education has been a response to guilt, or shame, about ethical failure. 
Thus, in the us, the extent to which formal ethics instruction was spurred by 
Lieutenant Calley’s actions at My Lai is prominent in the literature on the sub-
ject.5 Indicators of the importance of the My Lai massacre are clear in military 
ethics curriculums elsewhere.6 Calley’s illegal actions are only one reason for 
which the My Lai massacre has shown the need for ethics education. In the 
classroom, attention is also given to the actions of the servicemen who resisted 
his command and who played a part in his arrest. Moreover, the pressure that 
led to the formalisation of military ethics education was also fed by the nega-
tive public response to the veterans of the Vietnam War. But social responses 
to guilt are not the primary interest for most military ethics educators faced 
with the subject in class – the place of My Lai in the curriculum focuses at-
tention onto legal guilt and not onto the social framing of guilt. This is a clear 
feature of the framing for My Lai in Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, too: My Lai 
is the primary example used in a lengthy section about ‘Superior Orders,’ again 
underlining that Walzer is primarily seeking to explore challenges in terms of 
legally-oriented notions of ethical behaviour and guilt.
A restrictive approach to the normative basis for professional military ethics 
may owe something to this legal paradigm, though the uneasy relationship be-
tween law and morality is a key feature of the academic literature that helped 
to form professional military ethics curriculums in Western military academies 
after the Vietnam War. Walzer, for all his debt to the ‘legalist paradigm,’7 does 
not accept a restrictive approach to teaching about the basis for ethical sensi-
bility: his contribution is an argument based on examples that are culturally 
and contextually nuanced. For arguments about the fundamental grounds for 
humanitarian interventions, Walzer argues on the basis of outrage to our col-
lective conscience and cultural sensibilities.8 His resistance to a reductionist or 
restrictivist approach is evident, too, in his description of the human sensibili-
ties which makes a soldier who sees the human in the person they target right 
to feel averse to killing them.9 Similarly, Paul Ramsey, a second towering and 
formative voice in the development of a post-war American literature on just 
5 See, e.g., Robinson et al., Ethics Education (n 1) 33, and David L. Anderson (ed.), Facing My Lai: 
Moving Beyond the Massacre (University Press of Kansas 1998).
6 See, e.g., Robinson et al., Ethics Education (n 1) 87, 122, 169.
7 Walzer (n 4) 58–62.
8 e.g., Walzer (n 4) 101–107.
9 Walzer (n 4) 138 f.
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war theory and military ethics,10 used a deeper engagement with Catholic and 
Protestant moral traditions to raise questions about the state of contemporary 
legal and ethical debate, instead of relying primarily on legal argument.
There is a broader, cultural dimension to the practical consequences of es-
tablishing guilt, which is nevertheless not established or explored in the just 
war literature inspired by the works of Ramsey and Walzer. Guilt, in the le-
gal model, is individual. It is criminal, it may be rightly punished, and may be 
judged on the basis of public reason. Confession may be viewed as a core and a 
rational response to this legal situation: it contributes to the repair to the nor-
mative breach that has taken place, and it plays a central role in much of our 
legal tradition, as a response to guilt and to its appropriate punishment. This le-
gal and rational, individualistic approach to guilt, embedded to some degree in 
many courses framed along the lines outlined by Walzer, is not entirely free of 
the complicating social and political contexts that also mark  Walzer’s account.
Guilt may instead be defined entirely socially: as a social phenomenon, not 
an individual one. Guilt in this sense has played a historic role in the creation 
of the moral status of the soldier. This ‘moral status’ is the phenomenon at the 
centre of Walzer’s approach to ethics in war.11 It is this status that in many ac-
counts of the nature of military ethics distinguishes the soldier from society at 
large, so that soldiers will be seen to perform their duty to society. This distinct 
moral status is a social reality in itself, and in the past at least this has been 
seen as a role or a duty that soldiers perform because they ‘owe’ it to society.12 
The different ways in which the relationship between soldiers and society is 
conceived across cultures has given encouragement to very different ideas 
about the scope and nature of this guilt, and about the practical consequences 
of a soldier’s guilt.13
Guilt, in the more sociological view, is a social and psychological response 
which is not limited to criminal acts: it is an acknowledgement that an indi-
vidual or group has incurred a social debt, and this debt is incurred through 
acts which place a soldier or a collective body beyond the norm accepted in 
social or political contexts. The subject of a burgeoning literature on the links 
10 Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (1st edn, Scribner 1968, 3rd 
edn 2002).
11 Walzer (n 4) 127, 138 f.
12 George Wilkes, ‘Talking About a Combatant’s Guilt: Diversity in Public Discourse about 
Morality in Post-Conflict Truth and Justice’ (2015) xiii:24 Religija i Tolerancija, 265–277, 
esp. 267–271.
13 Ibid 271–74.
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between ethics and military honour,14 in this context it is a given that guilt and 
confession are created by culturally determined institutions. Warrior codes, 
or honour codes, are a feature of military institutions, which have their own 
cultures and which reflect broader social norms and practices. Honour codes 
reflect very different cultural sensibilities about guilt and confession, ranging 
from those which treat guilt and confession as a reflection of military disci-
pline, or personal integrity, to those which prefer suicide instead of public 
 confrontation with guilt or failure – think of the literature on the samurai.15 
Following perhaps the most noted account of the continuing impact of sam-
urai culture on modern Japanese military culture, that of the anthropologist 
Ruth Benedict,16 scholars have distinguished between some societies as be-
ing built on cultures of shame (which is not spoken of nor reasoned about) 
and others founded on guilt (which is spoken of and can be reasoned about). 
Amongst anthropologists, the generalisations involved in describing cultures in 
this way remains contested, as does the confidence with which outsiders (and 
not-unbiased Westerners) have used the distinction to distinguish between 
Western and non-Western societies. In the literature on historic and  current 
uses of honour in the military, however, the distinction set out by Benedict is 
not used to describe individual motivation so much as institutional forms, and 
it appears to remain a serviceable conceptual framework in continuing use.
In the context of honour codes, what is elsewhere described as guilt or 
wrong is also rendered as dishonourable behaviour. The notion is embedded 
in very real social and historical contexts and practices of punishment or re-
demption. The codes respond to a social reality which goes far beyond Walzer’s 
focus, which is more narrowly to explain the force of declarative definitions of 
what is just and what unjust. These codes are based not on international law or 
virtue ethics alone, but on the encounter between stable social norms and the 
changing conditions in which militaries conduct themselves. New conditions 
may destroy stable honour codes, as the military historian Michael Howard 
has pointed out in describing the ineffectual complaints of fifteenth century 
European moralists about the introduction of cannons and hand held guns.17 
14 E.g., Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War from Ancient Greece to Iraq 
(Routledge 2006); French 2003, Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The 
Changing Culture of Military Conflict (Lynne Rienner 2002); Christopher Coker, The War-
rior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (Routledge 2007).
15 See, e.g., Coker, Waging War (n 14) esp. 1–7, and Coker, The Warrior Ethos (n 14) esp. 
108–109.
16 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Houghton Mifflin 1946).
17 Michael Howard, War in European History (oup 1976) 13–14.
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Moralists at the time spoke of the guilt of those militaries using gunpowder, 
and they spoke with all the force of the cultures that empowered them to de-
fine guilt, though they made no great impact on the practice of warfare at the 
time and ultimately it was the honour code, not the military practice, which 
had to change.
Cultures of guilt and confession can impact on the military profession in 
still other ways that imply some social realism or cultural realism. In a range 
of cultures, guilt is not just the soldier’s fate when breaching the laws of war. 
A special moral status is also taken on by the act of bearing arms. This dis-
tinct moral status is often ceremonially acknowledged again in setting out to 
war. This special status could be described as a socially understood form of 
guilt, where guilt is created when an individual or group is understood to owe 
a debt to society. One practical consequence of this guilt is the exclusion of 
soldiers from normal society, a formal exclusion which can take many forms. 
Confession is one of the possibilities whereby societies may provide redemp-
tive mechanisms allowing soldiers back into society. An Orthodox Christian 
who sets out to war, for instance, may, following canon law, be declared in-
eligible to take communion for as long as they are at war.18 At the end of the 
First World War, the Serbian Orthodox Church required of soldiers in the army 
that they confess before they demobilized and reintegrated into society. In this 
example, we can see that bearing arms may be honourable and yet may still in-
cur a social form of guilt, of indebtedness. Similarly, from the onset of war, the 
warrior in service from ancient Greek and Roman times could be seen to take 
on the status of a sacrifice, paying a price on behalf of their society which was 
owed – which they were not free to avoid.19 If this is not moral or legal guilt in 
the sense that Michael Walzer uses it, it is nevertheless subject to the same ba-
sic mechanism as that which requires that professional soldiers today risk the 
ultimate sacrifice for their society and its values. Military professionals today 
take on a moral status which they are not free to avoid, and the most common 
assumption is that this is justified not only by their virtue but by the debt they 
owe to the society for which they fight. In return, society will owe also the hon-
ourable soldier a debt – though this may be subject to very different practical, 
social and political understandings.
18 Philip LeMasters, ‘Orthodox Perspectives on Peace, War and Violence’ (2011) 63 (1) 
 Ecumenical Review 54–61, here 55.
19 For a sophisticated discussion of the various sacrifices involved in Greek battle, see W. 
Robert Connor, ‘Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression’ (1988) 119 (1) Past & 
Present 3–29.
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The culture of confession may similarly be rationalised, or idealised, or 
it may be skewered in the more realistic gaze of the sceptic. Confession was 
a core feature of the model of truth and reconciliation pioneered in Latin 
 America and in South Africa in the 1990s, a model that has produced a vigor-
ous debate about the morality of forcing statements of confession in exchange 
for inclusion in a collective, social and political, catharsis.20 Confession is also 
quietly encouraged in judicial contexts such as the International Court for the 
Former Yugoslavia, more in order to provide an opportunity to enter a plea for 
lenience or to show contrition for the sake of the victims, and much less to add 
to the historical record or to join a cathartic moment in transitional justice.21 
However, this encouragement is not based on a universal recognition of the 
need for or the value of confession. Confession has not been modelled by any 
party in the peace process in Northern Ireland. Lacking a common interna-
tional standard for post-atrocity confession, the attempt to initiate new forms 
of institutionalised confession in judicial or quasi-judicial settings has created 
a mass of precedent, both successful and contested. Very little has been pub-
lished on the implications this precedent may have for confessions internal 
to the military. Should confession be made to victims, or to a court, to a supe-
rior officer or a chaplain? Cultures of confession differ greatly: what is deemed 
proper to confess varies, the proper means of confession varies, and the proper 
audience for a confession varies. The gravity of the misconduct at issue means 
that there is also a natural political element which affects discourse about ap-
propriate cultural norms for confession, as can be seen, for instance, in the 
very divided Israeli public discourse on the subject.
An insight into Israeli experience is presented here to show how confes-
sion may take a recognisable social form without the need for a formal judicial 
or a religious context. After each successive war, and most publicly following 
the 1967 war, Israelis have been treated to the publication of ever more ex-
tensive confessions from soldiers who remain in service, mostly as reservists. 
The model for this form of publication, recently republished with the inclusion 
20 For an introduction to the range of appreciative and more critical perspectives, see Patri-
cia B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commis-
sions (2nd edn, Routledge 2010) and Thomas Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Améry 
and the Refusal to Forgive (Temple University Press 2008).
21 Pierre Hazan, ‘Trading confessions for withdrawal of charges in former Yugoslavia,’ 
24 July 2015 http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/1387-trading-confessions-for 
-withdrawal-of-charges-in-former-yugoslavia.html offers a helpful critical review of this 
tendency, building on earlier work in Pierre Hazan, Justice in a Time of War: The True Story 
Behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Texas A & M Uni-
versity Press 2004).
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of  previously censored passages, was a set of interviews with kibbutz reserv-
ists who had served in the 1967 war, The Seventh Day.22 Before this, there were 
already confession-like reports of atrocity in the Hebrew press in 1948, some 
presented as literary accounts by some of the country’s best-known soldier-
authors. It would be wrong to assume that these confessions imply some secre-
tive national policy with regards to atrocities, though soldiers as in any army 
respond to a range of perceived pressures in preferring not to take reports up 
the chain of command or to go public. This was a phenomenon supported by 
senior politicians.23 It would also be wrong to assume that the decision of indi-
viduals to make their confessions public implies that they believe that abuses 
are prevalent or the system is unworkable, since these public confessions also 
reflect an relatively normal, if contested, means of civic or public engage-
ment. The 1967 confessions were for a long time anonymous, though with re-
publication the participants have been revealed to include prominent young 
 intellectuals such as the novelist Amos Oz and historian Abraham Shapira.24 
Participants were seen by some to be soul searching, proving their moral integ-
rity, and by others to be ‘shooting and crying,’ possibly (critics add) for party 
political gain.
These critiques have persisted as new waves of confessions appeared follow-
ing successive idf engagements. Subsequently, such published confessions 
have often remained anonymous, confessions that encompass both actions 
that soldiers were involved in, and actions that they witnessed and for which 
they express a sense of shame. The organisation Breaking the Silence, founded 
in 2004, has been the most prominent publisher of these confessions,25 direct-
ing public attention to them as evidence of the impossibility of maintaining 
a moral compass while also enforcing a long-term military occupation in the 
West Bank. In a recognisable part of the Israeli social and political landscape 
(commonly identified with secularist Zionism and with the political Left), 
these soldiers are lionised for their confessions. Further rightwards, critics26 
22 Abraham Shapira (ed.), The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk about the Six Day War (Penguin 
1970).
23 On the mass circulation of Alterman’s poem About This thanks to Prime Minister  David 
Ben-Gurion, also referring in passing to the popular works of S. Yizhar, see Yair Auron, 
‘Breaking the Silence: The Poem that Exposed Israeli War Crimes in 1948,’ Haaretz, 
18 March 2016. http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.709439.
24 Gili Izikovich, ‘“The Seventh Day”: Censored Voices from the 1967 War,’ Haaretz, 7 June 
2015, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.659923.
25 http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/testimonies/publications.
26 Represented by the selection of articles presented at http://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/
breaking_the_silence_shovirm_shtika_/.
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fully reject the content and the political use of their statements, above all on 
the grounds that they break faith with the nation by disseminating false im-
pressions to an international audience which does not grasp the real situation 
on the ground. Controversy notwithstanding, the form of anonymous confes-
sion appears to be established as a reflection of the public personality of at 
least a part of the Israeli social establishment. As fierce as the critiques they 
evoke may be, these are not voices from an unassimilated social margin. They 
speak from a basis of widely-held assumptions about the military covenant, 
and provoke dispute precisely because, in form as well as content, they invoke 
norms of behaviour and belief that are instantly recognisable as significant in 
Israeli society. In sum, Israelis can be said to have a culture of public and often 
anonymous confession. This culture reflects the social and political conditions 
of the nation. The same culture is lacking in many other states in which com-
batant behaviour is supposed to be governed by similar norms or standards.
This cultural reality need not be understood through a normative lens at 
all, meaning that confession need not be understood to have anything to do 
with distinctive or deeply held social or cultural norms. A more realist or more 
 cynical approach to confession may wholly reject the notion that confession 
creates a basis for virtuous and rational reparation after a crime. In the criti-
cal literature on ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ processes, this expectation is often 
seen as a reflection of a ‘religious’ idealism that is removed from the psycho-
logical needs of the victims of gross violations of their rights.27 More critically 
still, the act of confession in a truth and reconciliation process may be viewed 
as an act of political power – as victor’s justice. In this political perspective, well 
known from the writings of Michel Foucault, confession is not only an act of 
individual or political agency; it is also an act of political submission.28 Confes-
sion is, as Foucault underlined, a distinctively Western method through which 
societies have exercised power over individuals and groups. In Foucault’s ac-
count, power relationships are ‘performed’ through the circumstances of con-
fession. In the context of the ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ process, confession 
becomes an instrument to regain social legitimacy – to gain forgiveness from 
those who exercise control over that legitimacy. While this is most evident of 
public confessions in a truth and justice commission, it is also true of private 
confessions, conducted perhaps via a pastor or priest. It may also be seen that 
this Foucauldian political framing may also be placed on the Israeli soldiers’ 
anonymised confessions, which are ostensibly intended to achieve a symbolic 
27 See, e.g., Brudholm (n 20), passim.
28 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The function of avowal in justice 
(Chicago University Press 2014).
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form of collective redemption and an eventual political change: the soldiers 
make an appeal to a wider social and political order to which commanding 
officers and political leaders are supposed to be subject.
The practical importance of this social level of discourse about dealing with 
perceived guilt is a commonplace in the contemporary public debate about the 
need for a reinforced military covenant, notably in the usa and uk.29  Absent 
some form of communication or some institutional understanding with soci-
ety covering expectations about the relationship between soldier behaviour, 
military norms and civilian values, veterans may easily experience their return 
to normal society as alienating. The victory parade can be easily taken to be 
the most obvious marker for this transition, significant for its absence, for in-
stance, following the Vietnam War. In some cultures, as in Serbia following the 
First World War, a ritual form for confession on return from war is also seen as 
important. This confession grants military professionals symbolic social accep-
tance, though the act of killing in war is itself not intended to be approved by 
the Church which grants a soldier absolution, the freedom to continue to take 
communion, and the publicly acknowledged ability to rejoin society.
The social or cultural forms may differ greatly – the importance of this 
 social framework is nevertheless clearly common across cultures. Guilt, 
viewed through this wider cultural lens, remains the flipside of a powerful 
social mechanism, which can be driven by collective norm enforcement and 
which focuses not only on individual, criminal guilt. Institutions that promote 
professional military ethics may take very different approaches to the impact 
of this mechanism: to minimise it or to channel it. They may, on the one hand 
seek to direct professionals to deal with post-conflict reckoning through more 
rationalistic means, or through an individualistic account of guilt and its con-
sequences. Alternatively they may seek to relate the military professional’s ex-
perience to the social reality they will rejoin. The relationship between these 
two is likely to be publicly disputed. It will be the more complex the more this 
social reality is engaged with. An attempt to define it in terms of a military 
covenant will only touch on a part of the reality.
For the purposes of the international, cross-military perspective invoked in 
the present discussion, it is enough that we allow that the choices available to 
military professionals – and the practical costs and benefits of each choice – 
will appear to be different in different cultures and in different contexts.
29 E.g., Anthony Forster, ‘The Military Covenant and British Civil-Military Relations’ (2012) 
38 (2) Armed Forces & Society 273–290.
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 Practical Grounds for Embracing Points of Cultural Diversity in 
International Dialogue about Military Ethics
In what follows, we explore ways in which cultural divides may make a practi-
cal difference in a military context.
At the practical level, there is no simple opposition or linear relationship 
between the types of restrictive or expansive choices we might make in think-
ing about professional military ethics education and cultural diversity. The 
very different types of problem for which cultural diversity appears a matter 
of practical relevance imply that we may make very different choices about 
including or excluding this diversity according to context.
Restrictive approaches to the teaching of military ethics are not all alike – 
they may rest on very different practical grounds. To some, cultural diversity 
may be seen to make a fundamental difference in reality, but in their insti-
tutional context there may nevertheless be good reasons not to teach it. We 
may, thus, for entirely practical reasons, see the need to restrict our notion of 
military ethics to a professional common ground – perhaps associated with 
a core set of military virtues or values – regardless of an initial inclination 
towards an expansive approach. As a consequence of this, formal teaching 
may relegate issues of guilt to the private sphere, implying a belief that what 
follows from guilt does not matter in the inculcation of professional ethics, 
or believing that these matters ought not to interfere with rational military 
decision-making. Even if we do accept that social guilt and other cultural or 
psychological drivers of ethical behaviour make a difference, these may still 
be best avoided on the grounds that this undermines the clarity of teaching, or 
because these would undermine the commitment of our professionals to the 
agreed international legal standard. Perhaps, as is common, the topic of guilt 
will be seen to reflect a level of complexity which is not appropriate for an eth-
ics component in basic training for the lower ranks, assuming that it is credible 
that a core set of virtues that transcend cultures will have a straightforward 
purchase on recruits from a particular culture. Very different types of restric-
tive approach may therefore be imagined, some of which posit that this whole 
area is not helpful or not important, and others of which grant that it matters, 
but in  defined ways.
Expansive approaches to military ethics education, embracing the cultural 
dimensions of military ethics, are similarly not all the same. The impact of 
cultural diversity may simply be taken on board as a challenge for the military 
professional seeking to apply universal principles and values. The questions 
could quickly become very practical where militaries are in contact with oth-
er cultures. How, for instance, should members of the International Security 
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 Assistance Force (isaf) in Afghanistan have responded to local norms alive in 
the Afghan National Army, or in the civilian populations which were patrolled 
by isaf, which do not fit with the standards which the internationals are at-
tached to? How should cultural diversity within a multinational deployment 
be dealt with by a professional whose national force is only playing a support-
ing role – should they accept the norm of the lead actor, or should they find 
ways to demarcate responsibilities in order to protect their own sense of bind-
ing or appropriate norms?
Cultural diversity may, alternatively, be seen as a valuable and vivid demon-
stration that ethics are a very real presence in a military professional’s career 
and life – not only nice words reflecting an abstract liberal idealism. This is a 
chief reason for which cultural diversity is invoked in the literature on honour 
codes.30 It has also been a feature of the development of academic literature 
on parallels to just war thinking in non-Christian religious traditions.31 The 
two motives may combine: In the ethics course in a military academy, for in-
stance, the space for diversity may be implied in the allocation of class time for 
a Christian pacifist. They may understand their role – judging by reports from 
pacifists who have played this role in us and uk ethics courses – to be not only 
to outline their reasons for adhering to pacifism but also to present their sense 
of how the meaning of a human life implies serious consideration for the wel-
fare of soldiers and civilians, and the proper treatment of the dead. The stakes 
are thus very practical, and the lessons offered are intended to raise and at the 
same time also to transcend cultural or normative differences.
One consequence of the present argument is that a means to clarify why and 
how teaching about cultural differences should be either restricted or elaborat-
ed is of practical interest. This would help to prepare students to understand 
basic ways in which the impact of cultural diversity is felt in determining what 
constitutes military ethics. In what follows, three practical contexts are offered 
to show that different forms of cultural difference remain of interest, even if 
in a given teaching situation or professional encounter it is judged to be pref-
erable to maintain a restrictive approach in identifying the nature of profes-
sional military ethics.
The first type of situation in which culture makes a practical difference is be-
tween military units from different countries that serve together on a  mission. 
30 E.g., Coker, Waging War (n 14), and Coker, The Warrior Ethos (n 14).
31 John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical 
Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Greenwood Press, 1991); 
David Rodin and Richard Sorabji (eds), The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different 
Traditions (Ashgate 2006).
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This experience of cultural difference is a common enough experience for 
peacekeepers, or for participants in other multinational coalitions. The ethical 
or moral dimension of such differences may be difficult to pin down, because 
it may be quite contingent institutional and political factors that do most to 
differentiate rules of engagement or broader differences in terms of military 
culture. The potential for different ethical cultures to produce a troubling situ-
ation for commanders may nevertheless be imagined through a concrete in-
stance: Two military professionals from different militaries serve together on 
a peacekeeping mission but face different consequences for the same moral 
failure. One is dishonourably discharged, the other instead faces internal dis-
cipline and remains in post. Multinational operations naturally engender ten-
sions where national forces operate under different rules of engagement, or 
operate with different resources, and there may be an ethical dimension to 
this. The nature of punishment for moral failure is still more clearly related to 
the sense of military professionalism. This means it is more likely to strike at the 
unspoken features of the professional’s identity than rules of engagement 
alone are. A clash at the level of professional identities is potentially more 
damaging than if the clash can be seen to be simply about technical terms or 
about rules or procedures that can be portrayed as a response to temporary 
necessity or as matters of utility. It is not difficult to imagine different insti-
tutional responses to ethical failures eroding a multinational corps’ sense of 
commitment to a common mission. The cue for such a breakdown could lie in 
perceptions of the gravity or magnitude of ethical failure. If the soldiers’ ethi-
cal failure is gross enough, we will be tempted to argue that both individuals 
should have received the more serious punishment, the ethical or immediate 
practical stakes trumping the pluralistic instinct also alive in the governance of 
a un or other multinational coalition. Even if this is so, we may still need – for 
practical reasons – to understand the reasons for the differences between the 
reactions of the two militaries: it may make a difference in terms of sentenc-
ing, and it may make a difference to attempts to ensure the problem does not 
arise subsequently. The cultural dimension to this can be subtle, and is not 
easily regulated away: cultures internal to militaries are not only reflected in 
different regulations but also in different interpretations of regulations, and in 
different judgements about clashes over virtues such as loyalty and integrity. 
In one institutional culture it may be perceived that a military officer holds a 
duty to confess what they have done or witnessed, but in another institutional 
culture the circumstances in which the act appeared necessary militate against 
an unwarranted confession.
Secondly, cultural differences between militaries may matter on a mission 
in a host society with a different set of cultural norms. Our two  peacekeepers 
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serve in Afghanistan, for instance, and one shoots a civilian, recklessly. Let 
us imagine that it is not clear which peacekeeper fired that shot. One of the 
pair faces disciplinary consequences that give no satisfaction to the victims’ 
families. The other faces no consequences, while their superiors placate local 
 sentiment through a locally-sanctioned form of public reconciliation  activity – 
an apology is made to village elders, and a sheep is offered as a symbol of contri-
tion, as became the practice for some isaf commanding officers in  Afghanistan 
during General McChrystal’s term as commander of isaf, for example. What 
is the right course of action, and is there a right course of action? Would it be 
important to obtain a confession from the peacekeeper who fired the shot? 
What is at stake here reflects a number of practical contexts. Some will see this 
to be pure politics, for others it may be ultimately about the law, and for others 
still what lies beyond the law is a matter for private conscience. And yet there is 
also the scope for argument over the need for a common understanding of the 
respects in which actions reflect the values and corps d’esprit of a professional 
military. On a still more practical or concrete level, an eye on the long-term 
impact of the ethical choices available may be important for the commanding 
officers in the field, or for the planners at home preparing for participation in a 
multinational mission in similar circumstances. Thinking from the perspective 
of the military professional, too: I would rather face this in a classroom discus-
sion before sitting in a powwow with officers from other military forces won-
dering for the first time at the different possible responses before me; or before 
sitting in a courtroom witnessing transitional justice mechanisms about which 
I had no comparative knowledge.
This leads to a third practical point: there is a genre of questions here, on 
which a professional military perspective needs to be heard in public discus-
sion. Whereas the voices of political leaders, or religious commentators, and 
of a range of other civilian voices, are important, the military professional will 
live with the result of decisions taken about guilt in ways that the politician 
and the public will not. The military professional faces practical dilemmas 
where different ethical codes, or different cultural codes, present themselves, 
practical dilemmas for which lawyers and political leaders are not the natural 
decision-makers. Insofar as professional military ethical norms are to be dis-
tinguished from broader social, political, legal or cultural norms, the public 
debate should take account of professional military perspectives on where the 
boundaries lie, and why these boundaries are as they are.
Thinking of this decidedly national political context, there is nevertheless a 
clear scope for a common body of answers from international military ethics 
experts to have an impact on domestic debate. There will also be differences of 
approach or of emphasis amongst military ethics experts. In some militaries, 
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educators are expected to focus on the personal ethics of military servicemen 
and servicewomen, commonly because of the perception of a social crisis af-
fecting the military and civilian sphere, and often on the basis of a religious 
community’s engagement or a dominant political party’s with personal ethics. 
In other militaries, these issues are separated from the ethics curriculum so 
that this curriculum may focus on issues that arise in the context of the deploy-
ment of force.
The expansive approach to embracing cultural difference in thinking about 
military ethics is based on the premise that valuable lessons can be learnt from 
this diversity by an informed public seeking to understand the real impact of 
ethical norms in military life. In concrete, ethics in the South African military 
means addressing aids; in the Slovenian military, it has involved addressing 
marital issues; in the uk, by contrast, such personal issues are dealt with en-
tirely separately from coursework on military ethics, and the military ethics 
specialist would not be expected to address these subjects in the public arena. 
The practical judgements about what is appropriate or necessary here – and 
similarly in respect to other dimensions on which approaches to military ethics 
diverge – are not based on straightforward judgements about what is norma-
tively right. We may, if this pluralistic framework is accepted, expect a British 
military ethics educator to allow that an approach is right in the South African 
context which would not be necessary or appropriate in the uk, and vice versa. 
The application of restrictive or expansive perspectives can be seen to be very 
contextual: a different practical judgement about approaches may be taken in 
different political and institutional frameworks, and the appropriate approach 
to cultural diversity in the context of different international dialogues may also 
be judged in very different ways.
At present, cultural difference is not a focus of the international dialogue 
about military ethics – having in mind in particular the dialogue and the aca-
demic publication that has been promoted through initiatives associated with 
the International Society for Military Ethics. By contrast, cultural differences 
are very much a natural feature of bilateral practitioner and academic con-
versations, in contacts, for instance, between Chinese and Western scholars32 
where these differences more obviously impose themselves. The practitioner 
focus on restrictive approaches currently seems most natural. As military eth-
ics educators join the dialogue from a wider range of cultures, the divergence 
between restrictive and expansive approaches is likely not to appear to be the 
automatic default option.
32 See, e.g., P.C. Lo and Sumner Twiss (eds), Chinese Just War Ethics: Origin, Development, and 
Dissent (Routledge 2015).
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 How the Conceptual Relationship between Guilt in Professional 
Military Ethics and Other Ways of Speaking of Guilt Can Impact on 
Ethics as it is Taught
To advance the dialogue across different perspectives requires further reflec-
tion on the different practical and conceptual contexts at stake. Those contexts 
include the practices of those institutions in which teaching takes place, and 
this brings additional considerations to bear – quite apart from the military, 
cultural, social and political issues covered to this point. We may examine this 
internal military context by focusing again on guilt. At the conceptual level, 
what impact do restrictive and expansive approaches have on the nature of 
teaching about guilt in the professional ethics coursework that is taught in 
militaries? And what framework would enable interlocutors with these differ-
ent perspectives together to navigate the relationship between guilt in profes-
sional military ethics and other ways of speaking of guilt?
The correct framework for thinking about guilt might not appear to be com-
plicated if we take as a starting point a more restrictive view of professional 
military ethics. The various courses in professional military ethics at military 
institutions in the United Kingdom, for instance, do not give any extended 
time to reflection on the nature of consequences of guilt, let alone to the cul-
tural forms that confession take in the military. This may be said to reflect a 
pragmatic British military culture and not a deliberate decision to treat guilt 
as irrelevant to the promotion of ethical behaviour. The restrictive approach 
is natural in a practical teaching or institutional context in which talk of guilt 
is wholly left to the chaplain or to private consciences, or in which interna-
tional law is the sole basis for attributions of guilt, which can then be dealt 
with by a court martial or an international tribunal. There has been no formal 
decision taken in uk military academies or colleges to narrow guilt on any of 
these bases. The reasoning behind the practice of excluding guilt from a pro-
fessional military ethics curriculum may be more pragmatic still. By restricting 
the scope of military ethics, it may be expected that the result will be a simpler 
teaching, with greater coherence and, because of that, with greater power to 
direct the attention and behaviour of military professionals.
This restrictive approach to teaching could be pursued even admitting that 
specific cultural norms do and should affect officers or other professionals. 
This means taking the restrictive approach in a teaching context, not neces-
sarily with any bearing on the normative approach taken to the essence of pro-
fessional military ethics. Thus, it may be judged that students should first and 
foremost see professional military ethics as a useful tool, offering a common 
basis for practical and professional action even where at a deeper level there 
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may be no accepted common conceptual basis for action. Thus, while it may be 
all too obvious to students how greatly Western philosophers divide amongst 
themselves, the practitioner perspective taken in class may lead a teacher to 
insist that divergent theoretical responses not be taken as a basis for practical 
action. A compromise is made on a fuller communication about the nature of 
ethics, with a view to quick absorption of a practical view of what it means to 
be ethically compliant in the military.
This restrictive inclination already has a practical impetus behind it in a 
teaching context within the confines of one national culture which carries 
within it different sets of ethical expectation. And this is before even broach-
ing questions about common ground across cultures where the fundamental 
vocabulary of ethics is not clearly shared. But even in a mono-cultural context, 
the appropriateness of a wider cultural or social framework for teaching about 
the ethics of practical action may be of doubtful value. From the restrictive 
perspective, a practical, declarative approach to ethics makes sense of a pref-
erence to sideline discussion of areas that may appear to demand an indeter-
minate, unpractical reflection. Against this temptation, the observer schooled 
in the diversity of ethical approaches pursued in academia or in other profes-
sions today will perceive this narrower pragmatism as limiting. The problem of 
a narrow definition of practical ethics applies, for instance, where educators 
working with a situational or case-based approach to ethical decision-making 
are focused only on the calculation of necessity and utility. If the professional 
military ethics curriculum is focused exclusively on logical tools available for 
making hard decisions, an ethics of care may appear secondary in the context 
of ethical decisions which focus on the purpose to which force is to be applied 
– more the preserve of the psychologist or the chaplain than the commander. 
If a narrower or restrictive approach to the curriculum were advanced, similar-
ly focused on calculation of current ethical challenges, then a ‘good’ approach 
to teaching British military ethics, for instance, need not investigate other di-
mensions of the maintenance of institutional ethics. The curriculum needs to 
address bad practice in the past, in Kenya, or Ireland: good ethics would be 
adequately constituted by rational practice in the present, not requiring reflec-
tion on the lessons taught by prior failings. In isolating the core of the ethical 
calculation, the personal, institutional and political contexts may even appear 
a distraction.
On the other hand, moral failure may be deemed to have real political, so-
cial or psychological consequences. In what we are calling the expansive per-
spective, it may be argued that the cultural differences this raises must be an 
integrated part of the professional’s ethics education. Whereas the restrictive 
approach suggests leaving this to the chaplain or the government’s political 
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advisors, separating commitment to ethics from the decisions which follow 
moral failure, the expansive approach says that separating the two also risks 
giving the appearance that our ethical rhetoric is not grounded in realities, 
that the values of the military are not an institutional reality, and nor are they 
grounded in the political or cultural reality of the society in which the military 
sits.
In favour of the expansive perspective, it may be argued that practical 
 realities support the case for basing the ethics class on the consequences of 
culturally specific approaches to moral failures. This context can be seen to 
create an immediate and a vivid sense of the enormity of those failures. If this 
expansive view is taken, then leaving the consequences of ethical and uneth-
ical action to private conscience or to the chaplain may make these conse-
quences seem unimportant. Students may focus on their ethics coursework 
without relating to it. Leaving guilt, punishment, confession, and reparations 
to the lawyer or to the politician may also make the ethics classroom seem 
less important to the definition of soldier identity, agency and leadership or 
decision-making styles than the ethics course is intended to be. And insofar as 
there are large gaps between philosophers about the definition and foundation 
of practical or professional ethics, to leave these to one side has obvious risks 
too: the officer ought to be prepared to know that there are different philo-
sophical perspectives on ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ processes following on 
from the conflicts in which they are prepared to fight; they ought to be aware 
why it is that combatants in opposing forces will be intellectually prepared to 
understand silence and confession differently.
The notion of teaching a cross-cultural ethics in the military, going beyond 
one set of cultural and political presuppositions, remains fairly uncharted ter-
ritory. One reason for this is the challenge that course designers and teachers 
naturally think in generalisations about common or secular values, instead of 
viewing them as diverse or plural in nature. This is as true in secular, liberal 
classrooms as it is in academies in which ethics is taught by a chaplain, or, 
as is the case in many avowedly socialist military forces, by an ideological in-
structor. A bridge to a more embracing approach to cultural difference and 
ethics does exist in concepts of warrior ethics, built on Greek, Stoic, medieval, 
Japanese or other historical cultures. Building on the interest of a range of us 
soldier intellectuals and institutions in ancient warrior ethical practices, Shan-
non French has led the academic field in developing lessons from this historic 
resource for the teaching of contemporary military ethics.33 Viewed with more 
dispassion, these warrior ethics are engaged with by a variety of other scholars 
33 Shannon French, The Code of the Warrior: Exploring the Values of Warrior Cultures, Past 
and Present (Rowman and Littlefield 2003).
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less as a model and more as evidence that honour codes are a historic feature 
governing warfare in ways that reflect both soldier experience and broader 
power structures in society.34 Both of these more normative and more descrip-
tive uses of warrior ethics have the merit of implying an interest in the real 
effectiveness of codes of conduct, in the conditions in which codes of conduct 
succeed and also those in which they have failed. In the framework of our pres-
ent reflection on reasons for taking an expansive position towards teaching 
about diversity across cultures, they have the merit of engagement with ethi-
cal cultures that embody irrational shame, without relying upon assumptions 
about the internal power of guilt to move individuals by itself.
The challenges of more expansive approaches to the nature of guilt in fram-
ing moral discourses in the military are not easily wished away once they are 
recognised. They raise very diverse moral certainties, backed up by a combina-
tion of partisan perspectives of a political and a religious or ideological  nature, 
which may divide militaries, and which at least divide them from each other. 
Discourse about personal guilt, about psychological and spiritual consequenc-
es caused by participation in an unjust war, also plays an under- explored role 
in the so-called revisionist debate initiated by critical philosophers  (notably 
 McMahan35). These academic revisionists naturally place weight on assump-
tions about guilt insofar they are unconvinced by the conventional argu-
ments according to which leaders are responsible for ad bellum decisions, and 
 ‘ordinary’ combatants are not. Equally, defenders of the moral case for just wars 
may depend on features particular to their cultures, on religious values, or on 
an eclectic mix of warrior cultures chosen for their military utility.  Accepting 
the most particularistic aspects of their normative discourse may be seen to 
undermine the strength with which professional military ethics reflect univer-
sal values and commitments. The two opposing camps – revisionists and just 
warriors – are grounded in different arguments about the nature of obligation, 
and these are readily situated in divergent assumptions in the early Christian 
just war literature about guilt.
This may be seen in the challenge presented to scholars in the field by Nigel 
Biggar, for whom the nature of guilt is not a topic that can be lightly skirted 
past.36 Biggar sees his intended audience as a wide spectrum of interlocutors, 
Christian, secular, and ultimately also encompassing interlocutors steeped in 
entirely different ethical civilisations, though his polemics are primarily aimed 
at pacifist critics of the Christian just war tradition. At the same time, he argues 
34 E.g., Coker, Waging War (n 14); Coker, The Warrior Ethos (n 14); Robinson, Military Honour 
(n 14).
35 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (oup 2009).
36 Nigel Biggar, In Defence of War (oup 2013).
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that the proper framing for just war thinking is not modern but pre-modern. 
This conceptual framework is clear for him on the basis that it allows what 
he takes to be a full moral realism, based on Augustinian thought, which is 
evident throughout the book. The nature of guilt is one of the weighty founda-
tion stones for this thought, distinct in ways Biggar begins to unpack from a 
discussion of the theology of guilt, moral good and obligation more commonly 
used as a conceptual framework for just war theory: that of Thomas Aquinas.
Against either of these Christian intellectual foundations for ethical judge-
ment, in Biggar’s judgement, contemporary moral and legal fashions present 
poor competition. Biggar sees the problem that moral obligations may clash 
with international legal norms,37 and responds to this with an observation that 
will be familiar enough from other literature in the field, that in the clash be-
tween moral and legal obligations, the moral obligation is the more important. 
Biggar’s point also appears clearly in classic liberal accounts of the just war 
theory, with the difference that this potential for a clash between the ethical 
or moral and the legal is viewed in those accounts to be troubling. This pres-
ents, in the secular literature, a particular difficulty if it means that moral ob-
ligations will be prove less demanding or less restrictive than legal obligations 
are; few imagine the problem to lie primarily in moral standards exceeding 
international legal obligations, though this may be equally troublesome.  Biggar 
is, by contrast, thinking of a set of problems that may arise when states have 
unwisely agreed to a modern, secular rights-based international law that is 
not founded on moral realities.38 In his earlier account, Walzer faulted the le-
galist paradigm for excluding forms of justification for war that are evidently 
based on moral obligation.39 For Walzer, the protection of civilians will be im-
proved by the permissive inclusion of humanitarian preventive wars, for in-
stance, while the ‘supreme emergencies’ in which the conditions for a just war 
allows large-scale deliberate harm to civilians will be exceptional.40  Walzer’s 
permissive approach to obligation has been the subject of criticism since 
the first  publication of his book. It continues to be so, largely on the grounds 
of disagreements about what constitutes an obligation the breach of which 
 constitutes guilt, there being very different philosophical commitments un-
dergirding Walzer’s position and that of many of his critics.41
37 Biggar (n 36) esp. Chapters 5 and 6.
38 Biggar (n 36) Chapters 5, 6.
39 Walzer (n 4) 72 f.
40 Walzer (n 4) 251–254.
41 For a recent addition to the related literature, see Kieran Oberman, ‘The Myth of the Op-
tional War: Why States are Required to Wage the Wars they are Permitted to Wage’ (2015) 
43 (4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 255–286.
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For Biggar, the situation in which the agreed law of the time needs to be 
overridden may not be exceptional. That he sees it may be far more com-
mon reflects his scepticism about the moral foundations provided by liberal 
individualism, which appears from his perspective to be embedded in inter-
national law (a point which many will see as arguable in relation to the ac-
tual state practice of the Law of Armed Conflict). It may well, in Biggar’s view, 
be moral for a state to discard ill-judged liberal commitments to the protec-
tion of civilians where these are not practical for a mission to prevent further 
wrongdoing.42
The more expansively a classroom engages with these diverse approaches, 
the more rigorously the class must be prepared to situate the accepted practice 
of their own institutions within this wider academic debate. An expansive ap-
proach to the teaching of military ethics entails an engagement with a range 
of approaches to ethical issues which are not shared: contextualising them, 
teasing out their implications, examining approaches designed for very differ-
ent social and cultural circumstances which do not translate straightforwardly 
into today’s militaries. The task implies a large knowledge base and the ability 
to draw on a range of disciplines and cultural resources. The work to be done 
can expand quickly if the student is to see what is distinctive about Biggar’s 
view of modern humanistic just war theory, or about Coker’s work on the war-
rior ethos,43 and to be able to place these interpretive frameworks in an appro-
priate military context, in a political context, and in their social and cultural 
context. To encompass judgements about guilt, shame and honour in our cur-
riculum implies a much greater need to engage with cultural specificities, on 
the grounds that this is the real driver of ethical conduct, than is needed if a 
narrower consequentialist approach or a straightforward declarative approach 
to military values will suffice.
 Conclusions
This essay argues for the need for an embracing conceptual framework to ad-
vance understanding of effective professional military ethics across militaries 
internationally, given that very different approaches exist. We began with a 
general conceptual framework relating restrictive and expansive understand-
ings of what makes effective professional military ethics, a framework which 
need not imply a normative judgement of which approach is better, but which 
42 Biggar (n 36) Chapters, 4, 5, 6.
43 Coker, Waging War (n 14); Coker, The Warrior Ethos (n 14).
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takes both seriously instead of suggesting that these differences of approach 
are purely academic. We then used, as a device to help reflection, practical 
examples relating to guilt and its consequences, and particularly relating to 
 confession, to show how these differences of approach can relate to the re-
alities that some will describe as cultural norms, others as current or historic 
practices. These practical contexts are diverse, with the implication for our 
straightforward ‘restrictive-expansive’ schema that there may be diverging 
practical considerations that lead ethicists, decision-makers or teachers to 
want, or to need, to borrow something from each of the approaches.
We have ended with reflections on deliberately normative differences 
over the nature of obligation in war, points that are generally of more cen-
tral concern in the ethics classroom than conceptions of guilt or practices of 
 confession are. At the outset of the essay, it was noted that our choice to review 
the treatments of guilt in a professional military ethics context creates a dis-
tinctive framing device for our discussion of what constitutes the grounds for a 
restrictive approach to cultural diversity, and by contrast what would make an 
expansive approach natural. The differences between motivations for taking 
restrictive and expansive positions might appear entirely different if we were 
to choose other problems for consideration.
At the end of the essay, we have suggested that the consequence of focusing 
instead on the normative topics which divide just war theorists and public in-
tellectuals alike is to see that the same diversity of approach to the appearance 
of deeply-held assumptions about guilt applies, if only the academic literature 
reveals it more deliberately than is common in ethics classes in the military 
context. The two facets of our discussion – under-explored assumptions about 
guilt and publicly contested approaches to morality and the laws of war – are 
clearly related. Our concluding reflections on different normative approaches 
to guilt, permission and obligation have suggested that this shift to a wider, 
more publicly debated normative thematic focus raises as much complex-
ity and as much passionate disagreement as we would find by embracing the 
private, religious or social constructions of guilt and confession. Indeed, even 
amongst the most avowedly secular revisionist philosophers, these subterra-
nean concerns, of guilt, and of spiritual welfare, are evoked again in relation 
to the nature of moral obligation, albeit that they are presented in forms that 
open up reflections of a more universal, philosophical nature.
At the centre of the present essay is the account given of the real practi-
cal value contained within the dialogue across these differences for militaries 
cooperating in the field, for military educators seeking depth or rigour in their 
classroom, and for cross-national understanding in view of the public concern 
at the consequences of ethical breakdowns within militaries today. Put simply, 
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where differences across militaries are real, it is as well to understand whether 
those differences are political, cultural, or simply organisational, and it is well 
to understand what consequences they may have for normative thinking. If we 
accept that practical approaches to ethical commitment and to ethical failure 
can be embedded in very different cultural norms – whether these be about 
the nature and consequences of guilt, or more narrowly about the nature of 
obligation or the nature of right intention – this element of the foundation of 
professional military ethics projects will be seen to lie beyond the two common 
bases of a more restrictive scope for ethics education, declarative codes of val-
ues and logical tools for calculating the consequences of contestable actions.
If the spectrum of responses seen in the literature or seen in the classroom 
of the military academy runs between restrictive and expansive positions, 
these distinctive approaches do not exclude mixed practices, involving dif-
ferent judgements about philosophical and practical coherence and diversity. 
Educators working in established military ethics programmes may be more 
familiar or more comfortable with a narrower focus for the teaching of ethics, 
aware that this carries risks. There are ethics instructors who instead will be 
more familiar with ideologically or culturally specific teaching which embrac-
es the consequences of guilt, and again there are risks to embracing this within 
teaching representing the nature of a professional military, too.
Any position on this spectrum between the two theoretical extremes raises 
questions for the developing international dialogue about current norms for 
military professionals. In different cultural contexts, it may be more natural to 
reach for one of the two polar opposites, in spite of the problem areas that will 
remain on the margins of inquiry: questions such as, what is guilt? Or what 
can be demanded in the name of a permissive obligation? This essay suggests 
that the lack of certainty or the evidence of difference amongst educators in-
ternationally is a reason for engaged partners to treat this dimension of the 
academic dialogue about professional military ethics more seriously. It is also 
a reason for the classroom curriculum to give adequate background to those 
students who may face this in the field. The more we demand that our profes-
sionals serve alongside and ‘amongst’ people of different cultures, the more a 
full account of the social and cultural influences which make for different ethi-
cal sensibilities will appear to be a valuable investment.
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